The increase in complexity of modern mechanical systems can often lead to systems that are difficult to diagnose, and therefore require a great deal of time and money to return to a normal operating condition. Analyzing mechanical systems during the product development stages can lead to systems optimized in the area of diagnosability, and therefore to a reduction of life cycle costs for both consumers and manufacturers and an increase in the useable life of the system. A methodology for diagnostic evaluation of mechanical systems incorporating indication uncertainty is presented. First, Bayes formula is used in conjunction with information extracted from the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), component reliability, and prior system knowledge to construct the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix (CIJPM). The CIJPM, which consists of joint probabilities of all mutually exclusive diagnostic events, provides a diagnostic model of the system. The Replacement Matrix is constructed by applying a predetermined replacement criterion to the CIJPM. Diagnosability metrics are extracted from a Replacement Probability Matrix, computed by multiplying the transpose of the Replacement Matrix by the CIJPM. These metrics are useful for comparing alternative designs and addressing diagnostic problems of the system, to the component and indication level. Additionally, the metrics can be used to predict cost associated with fault isolation over the life cycle of the system.
INTRODUCTION
The customer's desire for a greater number of functions and higher performance can lead to an increase in a product's complexity, resulting in product designs that are not easily manufactured, serviced, maintained, or assembled. Over the past decade, effort has been put forth on many issues pertaining to design for assembly and manufacturability. As a result, formal methodologies have been developed. Design for assembly (DFA), perhaps the most mature of these formal methodologies, has proven to bring a significant cost savings in production. DFA can, in certain circumstances, lead to an increase in reliability, but also may lead to designs that are more difficult to service. Despite the increase in system reliability, costs associated with service over the life cycle may offset the reliability benefit [Gerhenson 1991] . However, less effort has been focused on design characteristics and design tools associated with service and maintenance issues in mechanical systems. 1
Overview of Research
In section 2 of this paper, we will briefly present an overview of the observation phase and the fault diagnostic process of mechanical systems. Figure 1 .1 is the diagnostic analysis methodology developed in this research. Three matrices are developed to complete the diagnostic analysis of mechanical systems. The first matrix that is developed is the ComponentIndication Joint Probability Matrix. This matrix represents a diagnostic model of the system. In section 3 the information used for constructing the diagnostic model is presented. The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), component reliability, and indication certainties are used to construct the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix. The modeling and underlying mathematics for incorporating uncertainty into the diagnostic model are developed. Bayes' theory and truth tables are used to incorporate uncertainty into the diagnostic model of a physically embodied system.
The diagnostic modeling methodology is applied to a hypothetical illustrative example.
Next, the Replacement Matrix is constructed by applying a replacement criterion to the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix. The Replacement Matrix represents the component that will be replaced during the diagnostic process (see section 2.1).
Finally, the Replacement Probability Matrix is computed by matrix multiplication of the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix and the Replacement Matrix.
The diagnosability metrics are extracted directly from this matrix. Diagnosability metrics are described in section 4. The illustrative example is again utilized to verify the analysis method and the diagnosability metrics. The diagnosability analysis results of the illustration example and a discussion of those results are provided in section 5.
Background Research
Gerhenson [1991] presents a systematic methodology to balance serviceability, reliability, and modularity during the conceptual stages of design. Serviceability design is used in conjunction with DFA to create a design that has enhanced lifecycle qualities and production benefits. A methodology is developed to analyze mechanical system serviceability in both quantitative and qualitative ways. Finally, Gerhenson examines the tradeoffs between service costs and other life-cycle costs. Ruff [1995] presents a method of mapping a system's performance measurements to system parameters. Performance measurements are the visible indications that monitor whether the intended function of the component is or is not being performed. Parameters refer to the system components that are measured. The diagnosability of the system is directly related to the interdependencies between measurements and parameters. Clark [1996] extends Ruff's distinguishability metric to evaluate competing design alternatives and predict how difficult each system is to diagnose. System diagnosability is computed a function of the total number of failure indications, the number of components, and the number of component candidates for each indication set. The system modeling technique presented by Ruff and further developed by Clark is yet further developed to model imperfect fault indications and system components to complete diagnosability analysis.
Wong [1994] presents a diagnosability analysis method that minimizes both time and cost during the conceptual stages of design. The analysis emphasizes the expected time to diagnose an indication and the expected time to diagnose a system. The methodology presented in this paper can be used with Wong's cost estimating method to predict diagnosability cost over the system life cycle. Murphy [1997] developed prediction methods for a system's Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals (Unjustified) (MTBUR unj ). The methods developed emphasize the ambiguity associated with system components and indications. Fitzpatrick [1999] develops an analytical model to determine the reliability and maintainability costs over the life cycle of the product. Fitzpatrick develops methods for predicting Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time Between Maintenance Actions (MTBMA). The beforementioned methodologies presented by Murphy and Fitzpatrick provide an excellent foundation for continued diagnosability development. The methodologies do not address uncertainty and false indications during the diagnostic process. This research builds on the methods presented, to include uncertainty in diagnosability analysis.
Henning [2000] develops matrix methods to compute and predict the probability of justified and unjustified removals. A diagnosability model is constructed using the information extracted from the FMEA and FTA. Matrix notation is used to describe the diagnosability model mathematically. The Failure Rate Matrix and Replacement Matrix are formed based on the component-indication mapping and replacement criterion. The matrices are then multiplied to compute the Replacement Rate Matrix.
Diagnosability metrics are extracted from the Replacement Rate Matrix. The methodologies presented in this research, are in large an extension of the research presented in [Henning 2000] . In this research, however, the idea of imperfect indications is introduced into the diagnostic model construction. With the inclusion of indication uncertainty, additional metrics are developed for diagnostic analysis. Additionally, the matrices utilized to complete diagnostic utilize joint probabilities instead of failure rates as used in Henning. Simpson and Sheppard [1994] devote System Test and Diagnosis to the study of diagnosis and test in electronic systems. A historical perspective is provided about the formal methods already developed and future areas of research are discussed in the area of electronic system diagnosability. Strategies for analyzing diagnosability are presented in the areas of inexact diagnosis, fuzzy logic, and the use of neural networks.
Highly mathematical and theoretical diagnostic analyses as applied to electronic systems are presented. Simpson and Sheppard [1998] organize a collection of technical papers written by researchers and scientists in the area of diagnosability and testability. The papers discuss subjects in the area of theoretical diagnosability from many different perspectives. Many of the concepts, theories, and ideas presented in Simpson and Sheppard in the area of electronic diagnosability are applied to the diagnosability of mechanical systems. The resources proved to be valuable and lead me to new considerations in the diagnosis of mechanical systems.
Conventions
Two important assumptions are used to complete diagnostic analysis of mechanical system. First, it is assumed that one and only one component is that cause of the system failure indication for all components in the system. Cascading and multiple failures are not considered in this research. Second, it is assumed that all system indications are binary. Indications can infer either pass or fail. The indications do not infer a degree of failure or a degree of passing.
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NOMENCLATURE
In addition to the assumptions made for completing diagnostic analysis, the nomenclature used throughout this paper is presented in Table 1.1. 
DIAGNOSIS OF FAILURES IN MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
The underlying goal of mechanical system diagnosis is to identify possible causes of failure, narrow the possible causes of failure to one component, replace the particular component that causes failure, and return the system to normal operating condition. However, because of system architecture, indication uncertainty, time constraints, or cost constraints it is not always possible to correctly isolate the cause of failure to one particular component.
In this research, we will focus on the observation phase of failure diagnosis in mechanical systems. The observation phase involves noting failure indications and conducting maintenance tasks based on the observed indications. The indications can be in the form of lights, gages and Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) output, or observable abnormalities noticeable to the performance of the system (i.e. lower performance of engine, loud noise) [Henning 2000] .
We are led to conclusions and possible causes of failure based on the observations. An example of this is the warning lights and gages located on the dashboards of modern automobiles. Operators can monitor the state of the vehicle and diagnose a problem without conducting diagnostic tests on the vehicle. Modern airplane systems have many sensors and BITE to locate and isolate system failures to a small subset of components in the system. If we assume perfect indications then an indication infers good when all components mapped to that particular indication are good and will infer fail when at least one component is bad. If a system indication infers fail, the maintenance technician may decide to replace or leave a component that could have caused the failure indication. If the technician replaces the (bad) component that caused the indication to infer fail, it is defined as a justified removal. If the component that is replaced is good, and therefore did not cause system indication to infer fail, then it is an unjustified removal. Unjustified removals, for perfect indications, are a result of the ambiguity associated with each indication.
The assumption that indications are perfect is not realistic, however. Indications may infer fail when all components mapped to the indication are good.
Therefore, unjustified removals of good components can be attributed to both ambiguity for each indication and indication uncertainty. Indication uncertainty can result from a variety of sources, including human error, experience of the technician, faulty equipment, environmental abnormalities, and ambiguous readings [Bukowski 1993 ]. The method for computing and predicting the uncertainty of indications is beyond the scope of this research.
Imperfect indications can also infer pass when one component in the system is bad. Misdiagnosis of this type results in leaving bad components in the system, defined as an unjustified leave. Finally, the normal operation of the system occurs when all indications infer pass and when all components in the system are actually good. Justified leaves are defined as leaving good components in the system when indications infer pass. Justified and unjustified leaves of components are a result bof indication uncertainty.
CONSTRUCTING THE DIAGNOSTIC MODEL
The first step in diagnostic analysis is to construct a diagnostic model of the system. The diagnostic model is constructed by first extracting failure rate and system indication information from the FMEA and To illustrate the method for constructing the diagnostic model, we will use a hypothetical illustrative example. This illustrative example will be used again in the diagnostic analysis methodology and diagnosability metrics sections.
Extracting data from the FMEA and FTA
First, the diagnostic model is constructed utilizing information obtained from the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis (FTA). The FMEA contains the functions of the components, the failure rates for each component in all failure modes, the effects of the failures, and the failure indications associated with each component failure. The FTA focuses on particular failures and failure indication associated with each component in the system. The information extracted from the FMEA and the FTA is combined to embody the failure rates and indications associated with the system [Henning 2000 ].
The component-indication mapping, based on the relationship between failure rates and failure indications, is presented in both graphical and matrix format. In the graphical representation [Ruff 1995] , the system components are placed along the top of the figure, and failure indications to which they are mapped are placed along the bottom. The lines connecting the components to the indications represent the rates of component failures to indication failure indication occurrences (see Figure 3 .2a). In the matrix representation, the components are placed along the top of the matrix and the indications along the side of the matrix. The failure rates of the components are entered into the appropriated cells for each component. Figure  3 .2b shows the matrix representation for the system graphically represented in Figure 3 .2a, including hypothetical failure rates. 
Component Reliability Computation
Reliability is defined as the probability that a system or component will perform properly for a specified period of time under a given set of operating conditions [Bentley 1993] . In this research we will assume a constant failure rate for mechanical components. The constant failure rate model for continuously operating systems results in an exponential probability density function distribution. The derivation of the probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative density function (CDF) for a constant failure rate assumption are presented in [Lewis 1996 ]. Equation 3.1 computes the reliability of components as a function of time, assuming a constant failure rate. Where λ is failure rate and t is exposure time for all components.
The reliability of each component, for all failure modes, is computed based on the failure rate extracted from the FMEA and FTA and the exposure time of each component. Exposure time is the length of time the components are in use. For the illustrative example, hypothetical exposure times, for an expected system life of 10,000 hours, are given in Table 3 .1. In the next section we will discuss how the component reliabilities are utilized in conjunction with Bayes formula and known indication uncertainties to compute the joint probabilities of all mutually exclusive events in the system and further develop the diagnostic model.
Incorporating Bayes' Formula into Diagnostic
Analysis Bayes' theorem is used to determine the truth of an event based on prior knowledge and current observation. If an event becomes more or less likely to occur based on the occurrence of another event, then the first event is said to be a condition of the second event. The conditional probability of event A given that event B has occurred is written as Pr(A|B). If events A and B are independent of each other, then the conditional probability is simply the probability of the individual events, that is Pr(B|A) = Pr (B).
Bayes' theorem is concerned with deducing the probability of B given A from the knowledge of Pr(A), Pr(B), and Pr(A|B). Pr(A) is called the prior probability. Pr(A|B) is the posterior probability. Bayes' theorem is used in diagnostic modeling based on inference drawn from prior probabilities of component failure and conditional probabilities of component-indication relationships. Based on the current observation of system indications, the joint probabilities are computed [D'Ambrosio 1999] .
Mechanical systems most often are composed of many components and indications and their associated interdependencies. The diagnostic model must incorporate each mutually exclusive event for all components and indications in mechanicals systems. For example, more than one component can be mapped to a particular indication. The joint probability of an exclusive event must take into account all relevant components and indications.
Four mutually exclusive events are developed based on the single failure assumptions during the fault diagnosis process. Any one component in the system can be bad while all other components are good or all components in the system can be good. Additionally, system indications can either infer pass or fail (see Table 3 .2). In our system, the Indicated Failures event occurs when one component is bad and one indication infers fail. False Alarms occur when one indication infers fail but all components are good. Latent Failures occur when all indications infer pass but one component is bad. The False Alarm and the Latent Failures are referred to as Type I and Type II errors, and are undesirable in any diagnosis. Finally, Normal Operation occurs when all indications infer pass and all components are good. The mutually exclusive events are rearranged into matrix representation. The matrix representation is commonly known as truth tables or joint probability tables. The cells of the truth table represent all possible mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events for the system during the diagnostic process (see Figure 3. 3).
C1=bad
C2=bad .4 is rearranged to compute the joint probability of an event based on prior and conditional probabilities (see Eq. 3.5).
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The joint probabilities of each event are computed based on prior probabilities and posterior probabilities. The prior probabilities for diagnostic analysis are computed from the component reliability model (see section 2.2). The prior probabilities are the probability that the component is either good or bad. The posterior probability needed to complete Bayes formula for diagnostic analysis is obtained from a known indication uncertainty. Indication uncertainty can be computed based on the probability that the indications will infer "fail" when one component is bad [Pr(Indication =fail| One Component=bad)] and the probability that the indications will infer "pass" when all components are good [Pr(Indication =fail| All Components=good)].
Indication uncertainty must be known to compute the joint probability of events in the diagnostic process to ultimately construct the diagnostic model.
However, during the conceptual stages of design, these values may not be known. The uncertainty of the indications can be estimated for conceptual designs based on similar systems or can be approximated based prior design experience.
As more knowledge is gained about the system, the indication uncertainty values can be refined.
The equations used for computing the joint probabilities of all mutually exclusive events associated with mechanical fault diagnosis are presented in Table 3 .3. 
Indicated Failures
) G i C Pr( ) B 1 C Pr( ) B C One | F j I Pr( ) G i C , , B 1 C , F j I Pr( = × × = × = = = = = = ! ! False Alarm ) G i C Pr( ) G 1 C Pr( ) G s ' C All | F j I Pr( ) G i C , , G 1 C , F j I Pr( = × × = × = = = = = = ! ! Latent Failure ) B j 1 C Pr( ) B C One | P j I Pr( ) B 11 C Pr( ) B C One | P 1 I Pr( ) B 1 C , P j I , , P 1 I Pr( = × = = + = × = = = = = = " " ! Normal Operation [ ] [ ] [ ] ∑ ∑ ∑ = − = − = − = = = n 1 i i C Miss m 1 j j I Alarm False m , n 1 j , i j I , i C HIT 0 . 1 ) G s ' C All , P s ' I All
Formation of Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix, PR
The Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix, denoted by PR, is composed of the joint probabilities for all events in the system. Based on the data and equations presented in the previous section, the joint probabilities are computed and arranged in matrix form. The cells in the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix that have a value of zero indicate that the particular indication is not directly related to the state of the corresponding component. For example, the failure of component one (C1) is not mapped directly to indication two (I2). Therefore the probability that C1 is bad and I2 infers fail is negligible or never occurs. Additionally, the probabilities of the indications are computed by summing each of the rows in the matrix. The probabilities of the components are computed by summing each of the columns in the matrix.
The Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix, shown in Figure 3 .4, for the illustrative example is constructed based on the assumption that indication uncertainty for all indications in the system is a uniform value of 0.01 percent, resulting in an indication certainty of 99.99 percent for bad components. Similarly, the indication uncertainty for components that are good is a uniform value of 0.01 percent, again resulting in an indication certainty of 99.99 percent.
In the next section, we will discuss how the ComponentIndication Joint Probability Matrix is utilized to complete diagnostic analysis.
DIAGNOSABILITY ANALYSIS
In order to complete diagnostic analysis, as illustrated in Figure 1 .1, two additional matrices are formed based on the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix. First, the Replacement Matrix is constructed by applying a replacement criterion to the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix. Next, the Replacement Probability Matrix is computed by multiplying the transpose of the Replacement Matrix by the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix.
Finally, diagnosability metrics are extracted from the Replacement Probability Matrix.
The hypothetical example problem is again utilized to illustrate and verify the diagnostic analysis methodologies.
Replacement Matrix, R
The replacement matrix, denoted by R, is a binary matrix. A predetermined replacement criterion determines which component is replaced for each indication in the system. The criterion could be component cost, replacement time, probability of the event occurring, probability of occurrence, or a combination of these factors [Heckerman 1994 ]. For the illustrative example, the chosen replacement criterion is probability of occurrence.
The replacement matrix is formed by examining each row (indication) of the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix individually.
For the illustrative example, the replacement criteria is failure probability. A one is entered in the cell of the component with the largest probability of occurrence for each indication. Zeroes are entered into the remaining cells of each row. This process is repeated for all indications. For example, for failure indication one (I1), component five (C5) has the highest probability of failure. Consequently, a one is entered in the I1-C5 cell and zeroes are entered in the remaining cells. The newly formed Replacement Matrix is used in conjunction with the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix in the next section to construct the Replacement Probability Matrix.
Computation of the Replacement Probability
Matrix, RPR The Replacement Probability Matrix, denoted by R PR , is computed by multiplying the transpose of the Replacement Matrix by the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix (see Eq. 4.1).
The Replacement Probability Matrix for the illustrative example is presented in Figure 4 .2. The Replacement Probability Matrix is a square matrix. The columns represent the actual condition of each component in the system and the rows represent the action completed on each component in the system. An action is defined as either replacing or leaving a component in the system. The values along the diagonal represent the probabilities of completing a justified action. Justified actions consist of both justified removals and justified leaves. The values in the off-diagonals represent the probabilities of an unjustified action. Unjustified actions consist of both unjustified removals and unjustified leaves. For example, the justified probability that all components are good and none are replaced is 0.93498.
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The diagnosability metrics are computed based on the unjustified and justified probabilities extracted from the Replacement Probability Matrix. The metrics are developed and discussed in the next section.
Distinguishability Metrics
Distinguishability (D) is the metric that measures the efficiency of fault isolation after completion of the observation phase. As presented in Henning [2000] , distinguishability is defined as the probability of correctly replacing a bad component given an indication infers fail. In this research the definition of distinguishability is expanded to include all possible courses of action during the diagnostic process. It is possible for components to either be replaced or left in the system during the fault diagnosis process. As previously defined, a justified action is replacing those components that are bad or leaving those components that are good. As the distinguishability of the system increases, the probability of completing a justified action is increased. By maximizing the distinguishability of the system, and thereby minimizing the completion of unjustified actions during the diagnostic process, repair cost and time can be minimized. Distinguishability metrics are computed to the system, indication, and component level (D SYS , D IND , D LRU ). Additionally, the system level distinguishability value comes in many forms. System distinguishability is computed for both actions and replacements completed during the diagnostic process. The distinguishability metrics definitions are listed in Table 4 .1.
The system distinguishability [D SYS ], defined as probability of completing justified removals, is computed by summing the probability of completing a justified removal for all components in the system. The total distinguishability of the system [D SYS, TOTAL ], defined as probability of completing all justified actions during the diagnostic process, is computed by summing the probability of all justified actions from the Replacement Probability Matrix. The distinguishability of the system normalized for justified removals [D SYS, JUST REMOVAL ] is computed for justified removals of system components (see Figure 4 .2).
In addition to diagnostic analysis of entire systems, it is important to isolate problems associated with specific components or indications in the architecture of the system. In order to locate and alleviate diagnosability problems with the overall mechanical system, the system must be analyzed to an indication and/or component level.
The component distinguishability is extracted from each column in the Replacement Probability Matrix. For example, the probability of completing a justified removal of component one (C1) 
RESULTS
The distinguishability analysis results for the illustrative example problem are presented. The illustrative example results are discussed in three different analyses. Firstly, the indication uncertainty associated with the illustrative example is varied to investigate the effects of indication uncertainty on system distinguishability. Secondly, the illustrative example is analyzed to the component and indication level to investigate how specific components and indication affect overall system distinguishability. Finally, system architecture is altered to investigate how component-indication mapping affects the overall system distinguishability.
Indication Uncertainty
Distinguishability analysis is completed on the illustrative example for various indication uncertainties. For each analysis a Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix, Replacement Matrix, and Replacement Probability Matrix are constructed. The indication uncertainty is assumed to be the same for all indication in the system to simplify analysis. The distinguishability of the system, D SYS, JUST REMOVAL , decreases from 0.7810 when the indications are perfect (100% certain), to a minimum value of 0.6212 when the all indications are 99 percent certain. Additionally, the probability of completing a justified action after the observation phase, D SYS,TOTAL , decreases from 0.9859 for perfect indications to 0.9551 for indications that have a certainty of 99 percent (see Table 5 .1).). As shown in Table 5 .2a, the distinguishability of C2 and C4 are zero, indicating that neither component will be replaced when bad. However, both C2 and C4 are replaced when they are good. Both components are never replaced when they are failed, but often replaced when they are still good. Additionally, the unjustified removal probability of C3 is also much greater than the justified removal probability. Significant diagnostic improvement should be focused on these three components. This can be achieved by altering the componentindication mapping in the system or by adding additional indications to the system. The system indications are also examined to isolate diagnostic problems and improve the distinguishability of the system. As shown in Table 5 .2b, the unjustified removal of components mapped to indication five (I5) is much greater than justified removals. Based on this, the components mapped to I5 should be examined, and determined whether to alter the component-indication mapping or add additional indications to the system. As shown in Table 5 .2b, the distinguishability of indication six (I6) is the smallest. However, upon further examination it is determined that the probability of completing a justified removal is much greater than that of an unjustified removal.
By cross correlating the distinguishability of individual components to individual indications, we are able to isolate distinguishability problems and complete design changes to improve the overall system distinguishability.
In addition to completing diagnostic analysis on the illustrative example for varied indication certainties, hypothetical design changes were implemented to analyze how distinguishability is affected for changes in system architecture. The illustrative system is modified into three hypothetical alternative designs and diagnostic analysis is completed. The first alternative system maps all component failures to one indication. The second alternative system maps the failures of each component to separate indications, resulting in 13 indications. Finally, the third alternative design uses the same number of indications as in the original system, however the component-indication mapping is altered (see Table 5 .3). System is modified from System 1, 6 failure indications
The distinguishability results of the original illustrative example and the three alternative designs are summarized in Table 5 .4. A uniform indication uncertainty of 0.01 percent is assumed (indication certainty of 99.99 percent)
The architecture of the system clearly affects the distinguishability of the system. For example, the maximum distinguishability (D SYS, JUST REMOVALS ) results when each component failure is mapped to a separate indication. Conversely, the minimum distinguishability results when all component failures are mapped to one indication. The distinguishability of the system is directly related to the size of the ambiguity group associated with each indication. As the size of the ambiguity group is decreased, the distinguishability of the system increases. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A method for computing the diagnosability of systems under indication uncertainty is presented. Initially, Bayes' formula is used to construct the diagnostic model of a physically embodied system based on information extracted from the FMEA, FTA, component reliability, and known indication uncertainty. The diagnostic model is used to develop a series of matrices that are mathematically manipulated to form the Replacement Probability Matrix. This matrix represents the joint probabilities of mutually exclusive diagnostic events. Distinguishability metrics, extracted from the Replacement Probability Matrix, are developed for evaluation to the system, component, and indication levels.
The methodology can be used to analyze systems at the conceptual stages of design or to improve systems already in use. Areas of concern in the architecture of the system can be identified and addressed to eliminate problems with fault isolation that may be encountered. The metrics have a mathematical foundation and produce an objective evaluation, thereby minimizing subjective analysis of conceptual designs.
Additionally, the methodologies are evolutionary. During the initial stages of design, concise and comprehensive information may not be readily available to completely analyze the system. However, as the design evolves and abstractness is reduced, the diagnostic analysis is based on more refined information, thereby resulting in greater accuracy.
The methodologies have been applied to an illustrative example problem and results showed that as indication uncertainty is increased, the probability of completing an unjustified removal or unjustified leave also increases. In addition, the architecture of the system also affects the system diagnosability. As the architecture of the system is altered to decrease the average size of the ambiguity group, the diagnosability of the system increases.
There is opportunity for future work in several areas. In addition to the observation phase, an additional phase of the diagnostic process, involving the completion of diagnostic tests, must be further researched. Diagnostic testing provides additional knowledge about the state of the components in the system, and thereby increases the probability of replacing a component that has caused the failure indication to occur. The methodologies developed in this research should be applied to the diagnostic testing phase. Utility theory and Bayesian networks should be utilized to maximize the knowledge gained about the state of the system components, during the observation and testing phases, while minimizing the costs associated with the fault diagnosis.
The use of the methodologies, not only as a design prediction tool, but also as a tool that can aid technicians during fault isolation procedures should be explored. There is additional work that needs to be completed in analyzing the cost associated with fault diagnosis. The methodologies presented provide a good foundation for estimating the diagnosability life cycle costs associated with engineering systems. However, it should be noted that the methodology cannot be used independently of other DFX analysis tools and methods. Throughout the design process, tradeoffs between assembly and manufacturing, to name a few, must be considered. A collection of analysis tools must be used to maximize the overall value of the system. Finally, the longterm goal is the creation of a computer program for diagnostic analysis using the developed methodologies as the underlying mathematics.
